ACCOUNTING FOR SPATIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF WATERSHEDS IN EVALUATING WATER POLLUTION ABATEMENT POLICIES by Qiu, Zeyuan & Prato, Anthony A.
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 3l,l(April 1999):161–175
O 1999 SouthernAgricultural Economics Association
Accounting for Spatial Characteristics of
Watersheds in Evaluating Water
Pollution Abatement Policies
Zeyuan Qiu and Tony Prato
ABSTRACT
This study evaluates three agriculturalnonpoint pollution abatementpolicies: regulating
the spatialpatternof agriculturalactivities, ambient tax, and abatementtax/subsidy. All
threepolicies incorporate spatialcharacteristicsof agriculturalemission loading andmove-
mentfor anagriculturalwatershedin theMidwest. The effects of spatialvariationin natural
conditions and landscape features on agriculturalemissions and crop yield are evaluated
using a newly developed biophysical simulationmodel and experimental data.While the
policies are equally cost effective in reducing agriculturalnonpoint source pollution, their
implementation feasibility is quite different.
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Agriculture is the leading contributor to non-
point source pollution and the leading source
of water pollution in the United States (EPA,
1994b). Agricultural nonpoint source pollution
is caused by sediment, nutrients, salts, organ-
ics, pesticides, and pathogens (Krivak). It is
diffuse, has complicated spatial and temporal
dimensions, and is driven by the vagaries of
weather. These features make it desirable to
evaluate agricultural nonpoint source water
pollution in an integrated watershed manage-
ment framework. A watershed approach is ad-
dressed in the Clean Water Act (CWT) and
endorsed by many governmental agencies and
professional organizations (EPA, 1994a; Water
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Environment Federation; Adler, Landman, and
Cameron).
Two spatial aspects of agricultural nonpoint
source pollution are significant for policy anal-
ysis. First, agricultural emissions originate on
agricultural fields. Second, agricultural emis-
sions are transported by surface runoff or sub-
surface flow to water bodies where they can
pollute surface and ground water. Agricultural
nonpoint source water pollution is significant-
ly affected by spatial variation in soil, topo-
graphic, hydrologic, geologic, and landscape
features in the fields and on the transport path
for a pollutant. The close relationship between
the pattern of upland agricultural activity and
downstream water quality has been recognized
(EPA, 1974; Dillon and Kirchner; Omernik;
Hopkins and Clausen). Watershed-scale policy
analysis should account for the diffuse and
spatially diverse nature of agricultural non-
point source pollution (Jacobs and Casler;
Braden et al.; Pan and Hedge).162 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, April 1999
This paper explicitly recognizes the impor-
tance of spatial variability in agricultural non-
point source pollution in designing and eval-
uating pollution control policies. Specifically,
the first spatial aspect of agricultural nonpoint
source pollution, i.e. the effects of spatial var-
iation in soil, topographic, and hydrologic
conditions on agricultural emissions, is eval-
uated using a newly developed biophysical
simulation model called Soil and Water As-
sessment Tool (SWAT) (Arnold et al.). The
second spatial aspect, i.e. the impacts of land-
scape features such as riparian buffers along
the streams on agricultural pollution, is con-
sidered by integrating experimental data on ri-
parian buffers with SWAT simulation results.
Following the least-cost framework originally
proposed by Baumol and Oates, a mathemat-
ical programming model is developed to eval-
uate alternative policies for reducing agricul-
tural nonpoint source pollution in an
agricultural watershed. Rather than assuming
uniform effects on all farms in a watershed,
the site-specific impacts of these policies are
considered. This approach is consistent with
the diffuse and spatially diverse nature of ag-
ricultural nonpoint source pollution in a wa-
tershed.
Previous Literature on Externality Control
Externality control is typically accomplished
with a Pigouvian tax or subsidy. The proper
level of a Pigouvian tax (subsidy) on the ac-
tivities of the generator of an externality is
equal to the marginal net damage (benefit)
produced by that activity, i.e. the difference
between marginal social and private damage.
The graphical presentation of the Pigouvian
tax can be found in Tietenberg (1988) and Pra-
to. Even though a Pigouvian tax or subsidy
results in optimal resource allocation, it has
rarely proved feasible because of the inability
to measure marginal social damage or benefit.
As an alternative, Baumol and Oates suggest-
ed an environmental pricing and standards ap-
proach for achieving a socially acceptable
standard of environmental quality. In general,
their approach does not result in a Pareto-ef-
ficient allocation of resources. However, the
correct set of effluent charges on pollutants
can achieve the standard at least cost.
Griffin and Bromley extended Baumol and
Oates’ framework to the case of nonpoint ex-
ternality and argued that, under full informa-
tion and certainty, there were four equivalent
policy alternatives to control agricultural run-
of17 the least-cost effluent charges and stan-
dards, and the least-cost management incen-
tives and standards. Shortle and Dunn showed
that these four agricultural water pollution
control policies have different efficiencies
when farmers have better information about
economic outcomes of agricultural practices
than planners and there are uncertainties about
the environmental outcomes. They found that
the appropriately specified management incen-
tives should generally outperform the manage-
ment standard, the effluent charges, and stan-
dards. Tietenberg (1974) expanded the
traditional general equilibrium model to in-
clude the kind of spatial detail that is impor-
tant for describing pollution and derived the-
orems which provide the basis for the
development of spatially differential, tax-
based decision rules. Segerson presented a
general incentive scheme for controlling non-
point source pollution in the presence of un-
certainty and difficulties of monitoring the
pollution contributions from different pollut-
ers.
Along with these theoretical developments,
many studies empirically evaluate the policy
alternatives to control agricultural nonpoint
source pollution. Most of these studies link ag-
ricultural practices to their adverse environ-
mental impacts and compare alternative policy
instruments for achieving a specific environ-
mental goal (Homer; Jacobs and Casler; Ja-
cobs and Timmons; Braden, Larson, and Her-
ricks; Chowdhury and Lacewell). Recent
empirical work evaluates policy alternatives
incorporating spatial characteristics and focus-
ing on nitrogen contamination (Wu and Se-
gerson; Helfand and House; Larson, Helfand,
and House; and Fleming and Adams).
This paper contributes to the empirical lit-
erature by evaluating alternative policies for
controlling atrazine contamination of stream
water in a Midwestern agricultural watershed.Qiu and Prato: Accounting for Spatial Characteristics of Watersheds 163
This study makes several significant contri-
butions. First, instead of assuming hypotheti-
cal spatial differences as in many previous
studies, the study accounts for real spatial dif-
ferences in a heterogeneous watershed. The
watershed is divided into several subwater-
sheds to account for spatial variability in eco-
nomic and environmental impacts due to var-
iations in land use, soil, hypsography, and
hydrology. Second, instead of evaluating a
variable input tax to reduce use of inputs and
the resulting environmental impacts, this study
evaluates the policy alternatives such as tax/
subsidy and regulations that promote the op-
timal spatial pattern of farming systems for
achieving predetermined environmental objec-
tives. Third, the study is motivated by atrazine
contamination in surface water, a serious water
quality problem in the Corn Belt. This study
assumes full information and certainty in the
sense that the economic and environmental
outcomes of agricultural practices can be ac-
curately predicted using a biophysical simu-
lation model and enterprise budget generator.
Economic Model
Griffin and Bromley’s uniform incentive
framework is extended to the variable incen-
tive case and then applied in a watershed. Fol-
lowing the notation used by Griffin and Brom-
ley, let yJ be the production bundle of firm j
with yj being the nthelement (positive or neg-
ative) of that vector, j = 1, 2, . . . . Y. Positive
activities represent outputs and negative ones
inputs. Pollutants generated by firm j are non-
negative and are denoted by zJ. There are J
firms and N goods or activities excluding the
pollutants. The production set of firm j is giv-
en implicitly by f J(yj, zj ) s O. We add a no-
tation Z for the cumulative pollutants from all
J firms. Instead of assuming additive pollut-
ants, i.e. Z = S;=~d, cumulative pollutants are
assumed to be a function of zj, i.e. Z = g(u,
ZJ), where u are exogenous physical parame-
ters affecting pollutant accumulation. Obvi-
ously, the former specification is just a special
case of the latter. Suppose the cumulative pol-
lutants are limited to Z*. Society’s problem
can be formulated as maximizing total profits
given productive abilities and the constraint on
pollutants. Society’s Lagrangian is
,=, ,=,
– P&(u, z’) – Z*),
where p is a price vector, the KJ’Sand p are
appropriate Lagrange multipliers. Assuming
all necessary conditions hold, the following
first-order conditions describe the optimal
choice of production activities:
af’(y’, z’)
P), — aj = O for all j and n,
~Y/t
and
On the private side, let sj represent the per-
unit incentive for pollutants generated by firm
j and Zj* the incentive base level for firm j.
Pollutant emissions above ZJ* are taxed at a
rate of sj and emissions below ZJ*are subsized
at the same rate. If firm j maximizes profits in
the presence of such an incentive, then the pri-
vate Lagrangian is LJ = pyJ – Nf @J, ZJ) +
* — @)# d(zj
The optimality conditions are then given by
the following equations:
dfJ(yJ, ZJ)




– SJ = O for all j.
If the private value of productive abilities is
equivalent to the social value (SJ = aJ ) and
the incentive (sj) is set equal to p.[dg(u, z~)/
azj], then the social and private solutions are
the same. Griffin and Bromley’s other argu-
ments can be extended from here.
It is interesting to note that the incentive
depends on the functional form of g(u, zj). If
g(u, ZJ) = ~f., ZJ, as specified by Griffin and
Bromley, the incentive should be the same
across all firms. Such a decision rule is appro-164 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, April 1999
priate for “uniformly mixed fond pollutants”
defined by Tietenberg (1988). The darnage
caused by these pollutants depends on the
amount entering soil, water, and atmosphere
and is relatively insensitive to where the emis-
sions enter the environmental medium. In con-
trast to the uniformly mixed fond pollutant,
there are “nonuniformly mixed surface pol-
lutants.” The damage caused by these pollut-
ants is related to their concentration levels in
the medium, which are sensitive to the amount
of pollutants, the volume of the medium, and
the location of emissions. In this case, g(ct, ZJ)
is not necessarily an additive function. The re-
sulting incentive would vary by firm in order
to achieve the desired environmental quality
in a cost-effective manner.
Water pollution can be classified as a non-
uniformly mixed surface pollutant as dis-
cussed above. In this paper, the above frame-
work is used to describe how a fully informed
watershed planning authority (WPA) would
select farming systems in a watershed so as to
achieve a specific water quality objective at
minimum loss in total watershed net return
(TWNR). A farming system specifies crop ro-
tation, tillage method, and pesticide and fer-
tilizer application rates. An agricultural water-
shed is divided into several subwatersheds and
each subwatershed is treated as a separate
source of pollution in accounting for spatial
variabilityy in soil, topographic, hydrologic,
geologic, and landscape features. Cumulative
water pollution at the watershed outlet is a
weighted average of water pollution from all
subwatersheds. The weights account for the
contributions of pollution from subwatersheds
to the cumulative pollution at the watershed
outlet.
The following mathematical programming
model applies the general framework dis-
cussed above and determines the cost-effective
spatial pattern of farming systems in the wa-
tershed, {x? }, and the efficient abatement of
pollutant k in subwatershed j, {y~ }:
(1) maximize for x,, i i ~t,x,,c,
1=1,=1
subject to:
(2) b,, – Y,, – $ e,,,x,, ~ O for all k and j,
(4) ~ xl, s 1 for all j,
/=I
(5) x,, 2 0,
(6) Y,, ~ 0,
where i is a farming system index, j is a sub-
watershed index, k is a water quality index, Cj
is the total cropland acreage in subwatershed
j, T,J is the per-acre annual net return for farm-
ing system i in subwatershed j as discussed
below, eij~ is the amount of pollutant k gen-
erated by farming system i in subwatershed j
as estimated by the SWAT model, b~j is the
baseline level of water pollutant k at the outlet
of subwatershed j, B~ is the baseline level of
water pollutant k at the watershed outlet, w~,
is the contribution rate of subwatershed j to
pollutant k as estimated by the SWAT model,
Xti is the proportion of cropland in farming
system i in subwatershed j, ykj is the efficient
abatement of water pollutant k in subwater-
shed j, and Rk is the desired level of water
pollutant k at the watershed outlet as selected
by the WPA.
The baseline solution maximizes total wa-
tershed net return (TWNR), given in equation
(1), only subject to resource constraints given
by equations (4) and (5). The water quality
indicators for the baseline (b~, and B~) are es-
timated from the baseline solution {x~ },
* for all k and j, and Bk namely b~j = ~!. I eqkxij
= ~:.l Wkjbk, for all k. The biophysical simu-
lation model accounts for the delivery of ag-
ricultural pollutants within subwatersheds.
Contribution rates used in the second water
quality constraints (wkJ)capture the delivery of
pollutants from subwatershed outlets to the
watershed outlet.
The two water quality constraints require
water quality compliance at each subwater-
shed outlet (equation (2)) and water quality
compliance at the watershed outlet (equation
(3)). The simultaneous relationship between
water quality constraints at the watershed andQiu and Prato: Accounting for Spatial Characteristics of Watersheds 165
subwatershed outlets is controlled by y~,which
is the efficient abatement of water pollutant k
in subwatershed j and varies substantially
across subwatersheds and depends on bkj, e,jk
and w~,. The latter are determined by the spa-
tial characteristics of the watershed. The above
mathematical programming model was solved
using the General Algebraic Modeling System
(GAMS) (Brooke, Kendrick, and Meeraus).
The shadow prices for equations (2) and (3)
are the per-unit marginal costs of reducing wa-
ter pollution at the subwatershed and water-
shed outlets, respectively, and can be used to
set the incentive levels at subwatershed and
watershed levels: {x,, } define the cost-effective
spatial pattern of farming systems, and {y~j}




The study area is Goodwater Creek watershed
in north central Missouri. It is part of the Cen-
tral Claypan Soils Major Land Resource Area
(MIRA 113) that includes about 10 million
acres in the Midwest. The watershed is also
the study site of the Missouri Management
System Evaluation Area (MSEA) project.
Broad nearly flat divides and gentle sideslopes
characterize topography in the watershed.
Broad alluvial valleys are often dissected by
small streams. The principal agricultural activ-
ity in the watershed is crop production. Crop-
land accounts for 72% of the watershed. There
are well-developed treelines and forest along
the streams and waterways in the watershed.
The area occupied by treelines and forest is
equivalent to a 105-foot-wide riparian buffer
strip on each side of the stream.
Current and potential crop production
methods in the watershed are represented by
37 farming systems which are patterned after
the six farming systems evaluated in the Mis-
souri MSEA project. Each farming system
consists of a specific crop rotation (corn-soy-
bean, sorghum-soybean or corn-soybean-
wheat), tillage system (minimum tillage or no
tillage), fertilizer application rate (low, medi-
um, or high) and pesticide application rate
(low or high). The 37th farming system con-
sists of a cool-season grass and legume with
no pesticide and fertilizer use. It approximates
conditions for cropland enrolled in the CRI? A
summary of the 37 alternative farming sys-
tems is presented in Table 1. Detailed infor-
mation about the specific amounts and meth-
ods of fertilizer and pesticide application and
field operations for each crop in a farming sys-
tem can be found in Qiu.
Estimation of Water Quality Impacts
SWAT is used to estimate water quality effects
of alternative farming systems. It is a contin-
uous-time, basin-scale simulation model that
operates on a daily time step. It allows a basin
to be divided into hundreds or thousands of
grid cells or subbasins. SWAT predicts the im-
pacts of agricultural management systems on
soil erosion, surface water quality and ground
water quality in large ungaged rural basins.
SWAT embeds a flexible configuration struc-
ture that distinguishes the different activities
within a watershed and provides a flexible
routing structure to control the movement of
water, sediment, nutrients, and pesticides. It is
suited for evaluating alternative watershed
management schemes. Studies show that
SWAT provides reasonable estimates of runoff
and hydrologic budget at the watershed level
(Bingner; Arnold and Allen). As an effort to
better understand the physical, biological,
chemical, and hydrological processes in Good-
water Creek watershed, SWAT was calibrated
and validated using the measured data in the
Missouri MSEA project (Heidenreich, Zhou,
and Prato).
To incorporate the spatial pattern of soil,
topography, and stream drainage pattern,
Goodwater Creek watershed is divided into 32
subwatersheds based on hydrologic condi-
tions. Complete field boundaries are incorpo-
rated into the watershed delineation. Each sub-
watershed is treated as a subbasin in the
model. Agricultural activities within a subba-
sin are distinguished using “virtual subba-
sins.” A virtual subbasin is a portion of land
in a subbasin devoted to specific land uses and166 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, April 1999
Table 1. Summary of Water Quality and Economic Impacts for 37 Alternative Farming Sys-
tems in Goodwater Creek Watershed
Farming Fertilizer Pesticide Net Sediment
System Crop Tillage Applica- Applica- Returnd
Name” Rotationb
Yieldd NCSJW ACSWC














































































































































































































































































































































‘ The first two or three letters indicate crop rotation. The last three letters indicate tillage system, fertilizer and pesticide
application levels, respectively.
bC = Corn, B = Soybean, S = Sorghum, W = Wheat, G = Grass, L = Legume.
‘ Detailed information about application rates can be found in Qiu (pp. 79 and 81).
dWatershed average levels. Values at the subwatershed level can be found in Qiu (pp. 101, 105, 109 and 113).
soil types. Each non-cropland use in a sub- land use, but only the soil type with largest
basin is treated as a virtual subbasin. Several percentage is assigned to the virtual subbasin.
soil types may be associated with a non-crop- Cropland in a subbasin is divided into severalQiu and Prato: Accounting for Spatial Characteristics of Watersheds 167
virtual subbasins depending on the soil types.
Thirty-two subbasins are delineated. Each
consists of one to seven virtual subbasins. A
total of 207 virtual subbasins are delineated
for Goodwater Creek watershed. ArcInfo GIS
is used to delineate the watershed, manage the
landuse, soil, hydrologic, and topographic in-
formation, and to generate land slope, stream
slope and length, and other input information
for SWAT. SWAT is run for each farming sys-
tem using daily precipitation from 1971 to
1994 in Kingdom City near the watershed.
SWAT provides three options for its output
files: daily, monthly, and annual. Monthly out-
puts are used in this application. While SWAT
simulates several water quality indicators,
only three are considered in this study: sedi-
ment yield (SY), nitrogen concentration in
stream water (NCSW), and atrazine concen-
tration in stream water (ACSW). Sediment
yield is measured using annual average values,
NCSW is measured using monthly average
values for the May–October period, and
ACSW is measured using monthly average
values for the May–July period based on the
24-year period used in the SWAT simulations.
These indicators and time periods are chosen
because they are of interest to the public and
researchers (Missouri MSEA Management
Team).
Since water quality impacts of riparian
buffers cannot be simulated by SWAT, exper-
imental data on riparian buffers are combined
with SWAT simulation results to model the
water quality impacts of riparian buffers. A
two-step procedure is used to estimate the im-
pacts of riparian buffers. First, sediment,
NCSW, and ACSW are simulated ignoring the
area of riparian buffers in a subbasin. Second,
experimental data on riparian buffers are used
to adjust the three water quality indicators
downward to account for the reduction in pol-
lutant loading to streams from riparian buffers.
Schultz et al. reported that restored multi-
species riparian buffer strip systems reduced
sediment and chemicals moving with surface
runoff by trapping over 9090 of the material
in the buffer zone where the plants and soil
microbes can immobilize and metabolize
them. Experiments on riparian buffer strips in
Nebraska conducted by Hoagland showed that
for newly planted, 50-foot-wide buffer strips,
pollution reductions are 7290 for sediment
yield, 24~o for total nitrogen concentration,
35% for atrazine concentration, and 61% for
runoff volume. For well-established riparian
buffer strips, these percentages are 89Y0, 7370,
88%, and 99%, respectively. ] Robinson, Ghaf-
farzadeh, and Cruse reported that an initial
9.8-foot-wide vegetative filter strip removed
more than 7090 of the sediment from runoff,
while the 30-foot-wide vegetative filter strip
removed 85Yoin their study area. The follow-
ing percentage reductions in water pollutant
loading are used: sediment yield, 85$ZO;
NCSW, 75%; and ACSW, 85%. Average val-
ues of the estimated water quality indicators
for watershed are presented in Table 1.
Contribution rate determines how the pol-
lutants generated in a subwatershed affect wa-
ter quality at the watershed outlet. It simplifies
the modeling of emission transport by assum-
ing that all agricultural emissions generated in
a subwatershed are transported to the water-
shed outlet in the stream flow (no deposition
or degradation). This assumption is reasonable
for a small watershed because the residence
time of pollutants in stream water is typically
quite short. It is more appropriate for dis-
solved pollutants such as nitrate and atrazine
than for suspended pollutants such as sedi-
ment. Contribution rate is measured by the ra-
tio of the area in a subwatershed to the total
area of the watershed for SY and by the ratio
of runoff water volume in each subwatershed
to total water runoff volume in the watershed
for NCSW and ACSW. The numerator and de-
nominator of these ratios are calculated using
monthly output from SWAT.
Estimation of Net Return
Net return for each farming system varies
across subwatersheds due to spatial variability
in crop yields caused by soil, hydrologic, and
topographic conditions. Net return equals
gross revenue minus average production cost.
1The experimental report was obtained from Doug-
las Wallace, NRCS, USDA, Columbia, Missouri.168 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, April 1999
Gross revenue depends on crop yields and
prices, and production cost depends on cultur-
al practices, input use, and input prices. This
study uses a composite crop yield that is the
product of a crop yield goal and a crop yield
index. The crop yield goal reflects farmers’
expectation of crop yield and captures man-
agement factors, such as fertilizer and pesti-
cide use and field operations. It is determined
based on field experimental data from the Mis-
souri MSEA project, Missouri average crop
yields for the two counties in which the wa-
tershed is located, and fertilizer/pesticide use
for each farming system. Even though the
yield goal is the same, actual crop yield may
be higher or lower due to natural conditions.
The crop yield index captures the impacts of
natural (soil, topographic, and hydrologic)
conditions in each subbasin on crop yield. It
is calculated using crop yields simulated with
SWAT and is the ratio of the simulated crop
yield in a subwatershed to the average simu-
lated crop yield in the watershed. The simu-
lated crop yields are not used to calculate net
return because they are not sensitive to man-
agement factors such as changes in fertilizer
use as noted by Heidenreich, Zhou, and Prato.
However, they vary across subbasins due to
variation in natural conditions.
Production costs are estimated using the
CARE (Cost and Return Estimator) enterprise
budget generator (USDA SCS). Production
costs include the variable costs of machinery
ownership and operation, materials, fuel and
labor, capital, drying, and management. Gross
revenue for a farming system is the sum of the
products of composite crop yields and their
respective market prices. Agricultural input
and output prices used to estimate net return
are average 1990–94 prices for the Midwest.
Annual average net return for a farming sys-
tem is obtained by dividing total net return for
all crops in the rotation by the number of years
in the rotation. Annual gross revenue for the
37’h farming system is assumed to be $60 per
acre. This is the rental rate in Missouri for
cropland enrolled in the CRl? The average an-
nual net return for each farming system is pre-
sented in Table 1.
Results and Discussion
The baseline solution maximizes total water-
shed net return (TWNR), given in equation
(1), subject to resource constraints given by
equations (4) and (5). Since CBMHH (corn-
soybean rotation, minimum tillage with high
pesticide and high fertilizer application rates)
is the most profitable farming system for all
cropland in the watershed, it is designated as
the baseline farming system. CBMHH is the
most used farming system in this watershed,
so the baseline actually reflects production in
this watershed. In the baseline, average annual
net return (AANR) is $96.51 per acre, TWNR
is $1,328,535, SY is 0.505 tons per acre per
year (TAY), NCSW is 3.86 parts per million
(ppm) and ACSW is 44.47 parts per billion
(ppb) at the watershed outlet. These results in-
dicate that ACSW is the most serious water
quality problem in the watershed, An ACSW
of 44.47 ppb is almost 15 times greater than
the drinking water standard of 3 ppb estab-
lished by EPA. This result is consistent with
the findings of the Missouri MSEA project
(Missouri MSEA Management Team). Four
atrazine reduction objectives are evaluated: re-
ducing concentrations at the watershed outlet
from 44.47 ppb (baseline value) to 24, 12, 6,
or 3 ppb.
First the uniform atrazine reduction plan is
compared with the least-cost plan for atrazine
reduction. The uniform reduction plan reduces
the atrazine concentration in each subwater-
shed to the desired level defined above without
regard to variations in natural conditions
among different subwatersheds and achieves
the objective at the watershed outlet. The
least-cost reduction plan reduces the atrazine
concentration at the watershed outlet to the de-
sired level, but atrazine reduction in subwa-
tersheds depends on the natural conditions in
subwatersheds. The resulting atrazine concen-
trations in subwatersheds are not necessarily
the same and are arranged in a least-cost fash-
ion. Table 2 gives the watershed-scale abate-
ment costs for each objective under the two
reduction plans. Total abatement cost is mea-
sured by the reduction in TWNR resulting
from the achievement of a particular objective.Qiu and Prato: Accounting for Spatial Characteristics of Watersheds 169
Table 2. Total and Marginal Abatement Costs, and Abatement Taxes for Atrazine Abatement
in Goodwater Creek Watershed
Abatement Cost
Target
Uniform Reduction’ Least-Cost Reductionb Marginal Total
ACSW Total Average Totat Average cost” Ambient
(ppb) ($) ($/acre) ($) ($/acre) ($lppb) Taxd ($)
44.47 7,775 0.66 0 0.00 1,558 0
24 106,449 7.73 78,461 5.70 12,846 308,304
12 490,038 35.60 432,762 31.44 36,512 438,144
6 720,604 52.35 676,130 49.12 43,461 260,766
3 836,388 60.76 808,470 58.73 45,418 136,254
‘ Achieves the water quality objective shown in Column 1 at each subwatershed outlet.
bAchieves the water quality objective shown in Column 1 at the watershed outlet and atrazine abatement varies by
subwatershed and is determined in a least-cost fashion.
cFor atrazine abatement at the watershed outlet. Determined by the least-cost framework and equals the shadow price.
dMarginal cost times the unrealized atrazine abatement. It is the products of Column 1 and Column 6.
The average abatement cost is the total abate-
ment cost divided by the total cropland acre-
age in the watershed. The abatement cost un-
der the uniform reduction plan is consistently
higher than under the least-cost reduction plan.
This result implies that accounting for spatial
characteristics of a watershed is important for
implementing alternative water pollution
abatement policies.
Table 2 also presents the marginal cost and
total effluent tax under the least-cost frame-
work. Marginal cost of abating ACSW is the
shadow price for water quality improvement
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Figure 1. Marginal Cost Curve for Water
set of the mathematical programming model
presented above. As an ambient tax rate is set
equal to the marginal cost of abatement pro-
posed by Baumol and Oates, total ambient tax
is approximated by the ambient tax rate times
the unrealized abatement in water pollution.
For example, the ambient tax rate is $12,846
per ppb for achieving 24 ppb of ACSW and
the total ambient tax is $308,304, which is the
product of the ambient tax rate and the unre-
alized abatement of 24 ppb.
The relationships among abatement cost,
marginal cost, and ambient tax can be ex-
plained using the marginal cost of abatement
curve illustrated in Figure 1. Let BECG be the
marginal cost curve for water pollution abate-
ment, B the pollution level in the baseline, BT
the level of complete abatement and BA* the
desired level of abatement. As shown in Fig-
ure 1, the marginal cost is BM and the total
abatement cost is the area A*BC for achieving
the abatement level of BA*. By setting the
ambient tax rate for achieving BA* equal to
the marginal cost of BM, the total ambient tax
is the area A*TFC, the product of ambient tax
rate (BM) and the unrealized abatement
(A*T)O
Figure 1 also shows how the desired abate-
ment level of BA* can be achieved by impos-
ing the ambient tax rate of BM. Consider a
reduction in abatement from A* to Al (the
Pollution Abatement farmer is choosing to abate less than desired).170 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, April 1999
Here the added tax A*AIDC is greater than
the abatement cost A*AIEC by EDC. To min-
imize cost, the farmer would choose to pay the
cost of abatement and avoid the tax by return-
ing to A*. On the other hand, if farmers reduce
pollution by more than A*, such as Az, the
ambient tax is the area AZHFT and the abate-
ment cost is A~BG. Farmers bear higher abate-
ment costs (area CHG). When farmers choose
an abatement level of BA*, the loss in net re-
turns is minimized (area A ,DFT + area
AIBE). Therefore, an ambient tax is an ideal
mechanism for achieving the desired abate-
ment level if farmers act rationally. However,
an ambient tax overburdens the farmers as Ja-
cobs and Casler argue. With an ambient tax,
farmers not only pay the ambient tax but also
bear the abatement cost. We evaluate three
policies that achieve the desired water quality
in a watershed with least cost and overcome
the drawback of the original ambient tax.
The first policy is to regulate the use of
farming systems in the watershed so as to
achieve the cost-effective spatial pattern of
farming systems given by the mathematical
programming model, namely {xi }. The cost-
effective spatial pattern of farming systems in
the watershed for achieving 12 ppb of ACSW
is given in Table 3. In order to achieve 12 ppb
of ACSW at the watershed outlet, all cropland
in subwatersheds 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 20,
22, 27, 28, 30, and 32 has to be in farming
system SBMHL; cropland in subwatersheds
10, 15, 18, 21, 24, and 25 has to be in farming
system CBWMHL; cropland in subwatersheds
1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 13, 19, 23, 26, and 29 has to
be taken out of crop production and enrolled
in the CRP; and cropland in subwatershed 5
has to be split between CRP and farming sys-
tem CBWMHL. Subwatershed 31 does not
show up in Table 3 because there is no crop-
land in this subwatershed. This policy
achieves a given water quality objective at
minimum cost in terms of the reduction in
TWNR, i.e. the abatement cost is at a mini-
mum and there are no other charges to farm-
ers. Implementation cost is low because only
the spatial pattern of farming systems needs to
be monitored which is relatively easy. It is a
simple policy because it does not involve eco-
nomic incentives. As presented in Table 3, a
regulatory policy has differential impacts on
farms in the watershed. Regulation of farming
systems is likely to be opposed by property
rights advocates. For comparison, Table 3 also
presents the spatial pattern of farming systems
under a uniform pollution reduction plan,
which is more complicated than under the
least-cost reduction plan. Under the uniform
reduction plan, cropland in each subwatershed
has to be split into two farming systems.
The second policy is the alternative ambi-
ent tax. The alternative ambient tax approach
sets the tax rate equal to the marginal cost of
water pollution abatement, which is the same
as the ambient tax discussed above. However,
the total alternative ambient tax is approxi-
mated by the tax rate times the difference be-
tween the desired and measured water quality
instead of the unrealized pollution abatement.
As shown in Figure 1, with an alternative am-
bient tax, if farmers decide not to reduce water
pollution, they have to pay a total tax given
by the area A*BMC. If they reduce water pol-
lution to the level indicated by Al, they bear
an abatement cost given by the area AIBE and
pay a tax given by the area A* AIDC. With an
alternative ambient tax, there is no extra
charge for farmers if water pollution is re-
duced to the desired level A* or lower. Hence,
not reducing pollution and paying an ambient
tax is always more expensive than reducing
pollution and bearing the abatement cost.
When water pollution abatement is more than
the desired level of A*B, farmers do not pay
the tax but bear more abatement cost. If farm-
ers are rational, they would just reduce water
pollution to the desired level (A*), Therefore,
the desired water quality objective can be
achieved by imposing the alternative ambient
tax. The alternative ambient tax functions like
the ambient tax but does not overburden farm-
ers.
Two options exist for implementing an al-
ternative ambient tax using the marginal costs
of water pollution abatement at both water-
shed and subwatershed levels. First, the am-
bient tax can be implemented at the watershed
level. For example, if the objective is to
achieve 24 ppb for ACSW, the tax rate isQiu and Prato: Accounting for Spatial Characteristics of Watersheds 171
Table 3. Proportion of Cropland in Farming Systems for Subwatersheds under Different Plans
for Achieving 12 ppb of ACSW in Goodwater Creek Watershed
Sub-
water-
Uniform Reduction Plana Least Cost Reduction Plan~ shed






























































































‘ Achieves 12 ppb of ACSW at each subwatershed outlet.
bAchieves 12 ppb of ACS W at the watershed outlet and atrazine abatement varies by subwatershed and is determined
in a least-cost fashion.
$12,846 per ppb. Second, the ambient tax can difficult to link the tax to specific farms in the
be implemented at the subwatershed level. To watershed.
achieve the same objective, the tax rate is The third policy is an abatement tax/sub-
$413.65 per ppb in subwatershed 1 and sidy. The policy is a variant of the alternative
$503.57 per ppb in subwatershed 2. Tax rates ambient tax and has properties similar to the
vary across subwatersheds. However, imple- alternative ambient tax. It achieves water qual-
mentation is difficult because it requires mon- ity in a cost-effective fashion but does not
itoring water quality at the subwatershed and overburden farmers. With an abatement tax/
watershed outlets. In addition, the alternative subsidy, farmers bear only the total abatement
ambient tax is based on an ambient concentra- cost of achieving the desired water quality. If
tion of atrazine in stream water so it is very farmers do not intend to change their farming172 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, April 1999
practices, they have to pay the total abatement
cost as a tax. The tax is then paid back as an
incentive to farmers who adopt the effective
spatial pattern of farming systems in the wa-
tershed.
Implementation of this policy assumes that
all farmers in the watershed are responsible for
water pollution abatement. Therefore, the
abatement tax should be levied based on total
cropland acreage. The tax rate equals the total
abatement cost divided by the total cropland
acreage in the watershed, that is, the average
abatement cost shown in Column 5 of Table 2
and the last row in Table 4. Suppose the water
quality objective is 12 ppb for ACSW at the
watershed outlet. The total abatement cost is
$432,762 and the abatement tax rate is $31.44
per acre of cropland.
The tax revenue is then used to subsidize
farmers who use the farming systems given by
Table 3. The incentive mechanism can be de-
signed based on average abatement costs in
subwatersheds. Average abatement cost in a
subwatershed is the reduction in subwatershed
net return per acre from achieving a particular
atrazine reduction objective at the watershed
outlet. It is calculated by dividing total abate-
ment cost by the cropland acreage in the sub-
watershed. Average abatement cost varies
over subwatersheds as shown in Table 4.
Achieving 12 ppb of ACSW entails an aver-
age abatement cost that ranges from zero in
subwatershed 31 (which has no cropland) to
$68.45 per acre in subwatershed 29. By
changing their farming system from CBMHH
(the baseline farming system) to GLCNN in
subwatershed 29 as shown in Table 3, farmers
in this subwatershed can be compensated up
to $68.45 per acre of cropland. The same rule
can be applied to other subwatersheds.
Through a well-designed incentive mecha-
nism, the abatement tax/subsidy policy should
induce the effective spatial pattern of farming
systems and achieve the desired improvements
in water quality.
An abatement tax/subsidy policy entails the
minimum reduction in TWNR for achieving a
desired water quality objective. Implementing
the abatement taxhubsidy requires the moni-
toring of farming systems, which is much eas-
Table 4. Average Atrazine Abatement Costs
in Subwatersheds of Goodwater Creek Water-





































































































































































































‘ At the watershed level same as Column 5 of Table 2,
ier than monitoring pollution. Another advan-
tage of the abatement taxhubsidy is that it can
be applied to specific farms based on their lo-
cation in the watershed.
Summary and Conclusions
Spatial characteristics of a watershed appear
to significantly affect pollution abatement
cost. Comparison between the uniform andQiu and Prato: Accounting for Spatial Characteristics of Watersheds 173
least-cost reduction plans shows that ignoring
spatial differences in a watershed is likely to
increase abatement cost. This paper uses a spa-
tial mathematical programming model to eval-
uate three pollution control policies that ac-
count for the spatial characteristics of the
watershed and achieve the desired improve-
ments in water quality at minimum cost in
Goodwater Creek watershed, Missouri. These
three policies are regulating the spatial pattern
of farming systems, an alternative ambient tax,
and an abatement tax/subsidy. The three pol-
icies are equally cost-effective because they
minimize the abatement cost (loss in TWNR)
of reducing atrazine concentration in surface
water. It should be noted that the solution set
consists of packaged farming systems. If the
solution set were more flexible with respect to
crop rotation, input use, and tillage practice, it
is unlikely that the three policy alternatives
would yield identical minimum costs.
The policy alternatives’ implementation
feasibility is quite different. Regulation is like-
ly to be viewed as an infringement on the
property rights of farmers. An ambient tax
would require water quality monitoring which
is expensive and time consuming. Implemen-
tation of the abatement tax/subsidy requires
monitoring the spatial pattern of farming sys-
tems. Even though it is relatively easy to mon-
itor crop rotation and tillage practices, it is
quite difficult to monitor input use. Implemen-
tation of the abatement tax/subsidy would
have similar difficulties as regulation of input
use.
One problem with the integrated watershed
management approach to control agricultural
nonpoint source pollution is the inconsistency
between a hydrological unit such as a water-
shed and subwatershed and an agricultural
management unit such as a farm. Water pol-
lutants in a stream can come from different
farms and a farm can be a pollution source for
several streams. This paper shows that it is
feasible to apply an abatement tax/subsidy
policy to farms within a subwatershed. Spe-
cifically, an abatement tax/subsidy can be tai-
lored to specific farms based on their location
in the subwatershed.
Selection of a policy is much more com-
plicated than indicated in this paper. Abate-
ment cost is just one aspect of feasibility. Pol-
icy implementation costs, political support,
and stakeholders’ preferences are other factors
that need to be considered in selecting a pol-
icy.
Another major finding of this paper is that
it would be very costly to reduce atrazine con-
centration at the outlet of Goodwater Creek
watershed to the drinking water standard of 3
ppb using the farming systems examined here.
Total abatement cost would be $808,470 and
average abatement cost would be $58.51 per
acre, which amounts to 61% of TWNR and
average annual net returns in the baseline. In
addition, CRP rental payments to farmers
would amount to $683,347. This finding sug-
gests that other technical and policy options
are needed to achieve the atrazine standard.
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